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In conceptual art, the idea is not only starting point 
and motivation for the material work, it is often 
considered the work itself. In algorithmic art, thinking 
the process of generating the image as one instance 
of an entire class of images becomes the decisive 
kernel of the creative work. This is so because the 
generative algorithm is the innovative component of 
the artist's work. We demonstrate this by critically 
looking at attempts to re-construct works of early 
computer art by the re-coding movement. Thinking 
images is not the same as thinking of images. For 
thinking images is the act of preparing precise 
descriptions that control the machinic materialization 
of images. This kind of activity is a case of algorithmic 
thinking which, in turn, has become an important 
general aspect of current society. Art education may 
play an important role in establishing concrete 
connections between open artistic and more confined 
technological ways of thinking when thinking pro-
gresses algorithmically. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION: A FIRST EXAMPLE [1] 
Without any initial ado, let us immediately engage in 
a little experiment. Take a look at the drawing in 
Figure 1. Imagine you were given the task of finding 
out how it was made. You are told that the drawing 
was done by a drawing machine controlled in its 
movements by a computer program. You are 
requested to come up with such a program that is 
capable of generating drawings of the same kind or 
style. Your code is not required to generate exactly 
the drawing you see in the figure. But there should be 
little doubt that your program, if allowed to keep on 
generating such drawings, one after the other, would 
some day produce almost exactly the given drawing. 
How would you approach this challenge? 
In all likelihood, after a moment of pondering, you 
would say that there are only horizontal and vertical 
line segments.You observe that, at the far left and 
high up, a line is starting. You follow it down until it 
curves to the right in a right angle. You will probably 
find it hard to follow the line much further since you 
lose track of it. But you see other cases of sequences 
of consecutive line segments that may produce in 
your mind the hypothesis that there are straight line-
segments alternating between horizontal and vertical 
direction, going left or right, and up or down. The 
hypothesis would be a bit daring to claim that you 
really see one line only starting at top left, and 
continuing by taking turns between horizontal and 
vertical lines. You don't see where, in the drawing, 




You feel ready to sit down and write code in a rather 
free symbolic form that you find easy to read. It may 
in a pseudo-code look like the following.  
input countMax; 
randomly choose a point inside the space provided for the image and call it "P0"; 
randomly choose a first direction from the two options {vert, hor} and call it "dir"; 
count := 0; 
 
repeat the following until count > countMax: 
{ 
 randomly choose an orientation from the two options {'+', '-'} and call it "or"; 
 randomly choose a length for the next line segment and call it "len"; 
 
 if (dir = hor) do  
{ if (or = '+') do  
{ P1.x := P0.x + len; if (P1.x > right) do { P1.x := right } } 
else do  
{ P1.x := P0.x - len; if (P1.x < left) do { P1.x := left} } 
P1.y := P0.y } 
 else do  
{if (or = '+') do  
{ P1.y := P0.y + len; if (P1.y > down) do { P1.y := down} } 
else do { P1.y := P0.y - len; if (P1.y < up) do { P1.y := up} } 
P1.x := P0.x }; 
draw line-segment from P0 to P1; 
P0 := P1 in coordinates; 
if (dir = vert) do { dir := hor } else do { dir := vert }; 
count := count + 1; 
} 
 
This is an algorithmic description of a line drawing 
characterized by the following features: 
The drawing is made up of one polygon whose edges 
alternate between horizontal and vertical direction. 
Edges are of random length and they stay within the 
given format of the image (whose left and right 
boundaries within a given coordinate system go from 
the x-coordinate "left" to "right"; in the vertical 
direction they extend from "up" to down"). Whether 
the edge goes left or right (and, correspondingly, up 
or down), is decided randomly. The polygon has 
countMax edges. It should be noted that the x-
coordinate runs from left to right whereas the direction 
of y is from top to bottom. 
Even though the description may appear a bit cryptic, 
it should be understood quite easily. We understand 
the individual lines of this description if we know 
precisely what must be done to generate the drawing. 
We may not yet know what must be done in order to 
make sense of the several appearances of the words 
"randomly choose ...". This part is still open and must 
be described before we accept the above as an 
algorithmic description. The symbol ":=" stands for 
the operation "the variable on the left of ':=' takes on 
the value that the expression to the right of ':=' 
evaluates to". This symbol is called the assignment 
operator. Its function is to assign a new value to a 
variable.  
Algorithms are descriptions of calculations, and such 
calculations are organized in sequences of discrete 
steps of simpler calculations. Each calculatory step 
changes in a precise and unambiguous way the state 
of at least one of the variables of the algorithm. 
Ultimately, assignment operations are responsible for 
such state changes. Therefore, the assignment is the 
most basic in all algorithmic descriptions. 
Our example is an algorithmic description because it 
is of finite length, it is unambiguous, and it is effective. 
A few conventions must be added to make the 
description unambiguous and effective. The property 
of being effective means that in each case of 
interpreting the individual statements that constitute 
the description, the interpretation must end in 
operations whose meaning is already known in each 
and every detail. In the end, a machine must be 
available that can carry out the description.   
To many of our readers this exercise may be pretty 
boring and trivial. We have started the exercise from 
 
Figure 1 | Georg Nees: Irrweg 1965. Credit: G. Nees [2]. 
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one of the first examples of generative art (often 
called "computer art"), i.e. from a given visual object. 
This object is trivial enough so that we could easily 
suggest simple operations of which we are intuitively 
certain that, if carried out truthfully following the 
description and nothing else, they are capable of 
generating drawings of the kind displayed in Figure 1. 
Even more: We claim that our description is capable 
of generating all those drawings, their entire class. 
This is a most important aspect of algorithmic art. This 
kind of artistic activity is interested in classes of 
images, i.e. in infinite sets of images! The individual 
image is reduced to an instance only of the class it 
belongs to. We may like or dislike one or the other of 
the productions resulting from executing an image 
generating algorithm. That's nice and justified but – 
we are inclined to say – it is no longer at the center of 
the aesthetics of this kind of art.  
We don't want to be misunderstood: Like you, we 
have our taste, and prefer some image over another 
one. Such emotional or otherways founded 
judgements are okay and will stay with us. Our point, 
however, is the shift from the individual and isolated 
image to the infinitely many images. With algorithmic 
art, a new relation between us, the appreciators, and 
them, the works, was born. Questions can now be 
raised like: Are all instances of a class of images of 
high interest? Do most of them arouse deep feelings 
of pleasure or beauty? Under which settings of the 
controlling parameters does the algorithm generate 
works of high quality? And for which of these settings 
is this not the case? If we are capable of answering 
such questions, we will come up with statements 
about good style. Such statements would, most likely, 
be possible only by experiment. 
2 | A SECOND EXAMPLE 
The heading of this essay contains a provocation: 
"think the image!" As if this were not outrageous 
enough, it contradicts explicitly what we would usually 
think: Images are to be made, drawn, painted, 
otherwise implanted or embedded into or onto a 
material. Yes, it is true: as long as we accept 
something to be an image only if it is an entity to be 
sensually perceived, it must exist in material form. So, 
thinking the image sounds like a stupid request. 
But be aware of conceptual art! Concept was, of 
course, always already part of the artistic process and 
practice that artists, to a lower or higher degree, are 
concerned with in sketching, experimenting, 
modelling, trying, repeating, revising, versioning, in 
short, with conceptualizing the work of their concern. 
With exception of a few cases, an artist is concerned 
with taking practical steps to get closer to realizing his 
intuition, his imagination, her intention, her fantasies, 
etc. When in conceptual art the concept itself was 
pushed up to the primary concern of an artist, this was 
an interesting further step in deconstructing the work 
of art. Sol LeWitt, in 1967, gave the formula: "The idea 
becomes a machine that makes the art." (LeWitt, 
1967) 
We do not know whether LeWitt was aware of the fact 
that two years earlier the first exhibitions had been 
shown of art that came out of the machine (Georg 
Nees, A. Michael Noll, Frieder Nake). If not, someone 
should have written to him: you are right, and it is 
happening already! But such detail is not important 
nor interesting. In historic perspective, it is all the 
same. The idea of thinking the image emerges at 
different places. At some places only as a nice, 
surprising phrase, at others in actual artistic practice. 
Thinking the image, however, in a radicalized form, 
becomes necessary in algorithmic art. Developing an 
algorithm for the production of just one image would 
be stupid and crazy. Thinking the image leads to 
thinking sets of images. 
The style an artist finally discovers to be the style that 
he or she, from now on, will be using and varying over 
and over again, the break-through that they have 
been waiting and working hard for, is of utmost 
importance in the course of art, in the unfolding of 
history of art. The style appears in one after the other 
work in high times of an artist's art. In the style, the 
artist expresses his or her thinking of images. So 
thinking the image has a long tradition and is, during 
the twentieth century, a major force propelling artistic 
processes. It is only consequential that around the 
middle of the century, this thinking the image was 
singled out as the creative approach to the world of 
images for the second half of that century and into the 
next. Thinking the image is the ontology of imagery in 
postmodern times. The material image is added as a 
sentimental reminiscence to comfort our dreary 
senses. The senses need to be nourished by the 
material image because we are not brains, much 
more we are bodies. 
When Descartes said, "I think therefore I am", we 




image, therefore I see it". Only vis-à-vis the extreme 
semiotic machinery (digital computers) the request 
becomes possible to think the image. It becomes 
necessary at the same time.  
But let us take up a second example (cf. Figure 2)! It 
is not too hard to convince ourselves of this line 
drawing being a polygon, again. A polygon is 
represented as a finite sequence of points. A polygon 
as an object of drawing is a specialized visual 
interpretation of such a sequence of points. The 
interpretation consists of straight line-segments from 
the first point to the second, from there to the third, 
etc. The polygon is closed, if the last point is 
connected back to the first. 
An algorithmic description of the class of all open and 
closed polygons is easy to sketch. In this sketch, the 
variable "close" must be set to the value "true" if a 
closed polygon is to be generated. Otherwise, it must 
have the value "false". As before, the value of 
"countMax" is the number of edges in the case of an 
open polygon. The closed polygon has one additional 
edge. So here is the algorithmic description in the 
same sort of formal writing. 
input the value of countMax; input the value of close; 
randomly choose a point inside the image frame and call it "P0"; 
Pold := P0; 
count := 0; 
repeat the following until count = countMax: 
{ 
randomly choose the x-coordinate of the next point, according to function 
nextX, and call it Pnew.x; 
randomly choose the y-coordinate of the next point, according to function 
nextY, and call it Pnew.y; 
draw straight line from Pold to Pnew; 
Pold := Pnew; 
count := count +1; 
} 
if (close) do { draw straight line from Pnew to P0 }; 
 
 
The interesting part of this description are the two 
lines that are responsible for determining the x- and 
y-coordinates of the next point, called Pnew. Two 
functions are mentioned that are obviously decisive 
for what is going to happen, heavily determining the 
visual appearance of the polygonal drawing: the 
functions nextX and nextY. 
That choice can be done by actually fixing the 
coordinates of a next point somewhere inside the 
image format. A different kind of determining that 
point is to choose a direction, and a length along that 
direction. This choice can be made in a deterministic 
or probabilistic way. The probabilistic choice is one 
where the new value is drawn from some given 
interval, according to some probability distribution. If 
the interval to choose from has length 0, it is a 
deterministic choice. The kind of probability 
distribution has a strong influence on the shape of the 
polygon. Our first example above had some 
deterministic part (the alternating directions of vertical 
and horizontal). Other components of the choice were 
of probabilistic nature. 
Michael Noll's polygon (Figure 2) indicates in its title 
a bit of what distinguishes the drawing from others – 
a practice often used in the fine arts. Noll called the 
drawing, "Gaussian quadratic". From this name, we 
may expect that one of the two coordinates is 
distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. It is 
actually the horizontal x-coordinate. The other 
coordinate is to progress according to a quadratic 
equation. (Noll, 1994) Noll did not publish more detail 
about this progression in vertical direction. We see 
that the line is mirrored back to the bottom boundary 
whenever the y-coordinate reaches the top.  
 
Figure 2 | A. Michael Noll: Gaussian Quadratic. 1963/1965. Credit: 
A.M. Noll [3]. 
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In neither example, we have said anything about the 
graphics. Our discussion was confined to the 
geometric aspects alone. Geometry, however, is 
abstract. Thus, it is not visible. A geometric line is an 
ideal object of the mind. It is not a stroke executed on 
paper by use of a pencil or any other drawing tool. 
Only when we add graphic parameters to the 
geometric objects, does the drawing appear as a 
visible object. So the two examples above must be 
amended by parameters like the width and color of 
the lines, perhaps also a deliberate visual emphasis 
on the points, changes of the values of graphic 
parameters along the edges, textures of the line 
segments and more. 
3 | RE-CODING 
Coding is the activity of describing an algorithm in the 
form required by some programming language such 
that the compiler or interpreter of the chosen 
language can deal with it. Re-coding must then be the 
activity of trying to re-construct the code of a drawing 
– in the case where drawings are the results of 
machinic calculations (that's our case). 
The situation is simple and clear. We are given a 
drawing. Perhaps there are more than only one 
drawing. We know, or assume, they are results of 
executing a computer program. But we don't have a 
clue of the program itself; at any rate, it is not 
available to us. In the case of several given drawings, 
we assume they came from the same program. In 
such a situation, our task is: Design code that is 
capable of generating images similar to the given 
images, plus any number of more. 
We are not interested in copying the given images. 
We say the task is solved, if the new code generates 
images that come close enough to the given ones. 
Images must not coincide in each and every detail. It 
suffices if a person, comparing the given to the re-
coded images, concludes that the two evidently 
belong to the same class of images, in which ever 
way that class would be defined. Intuitively, we seem 
to be capable of judging quite well such vague kinds 
of similarity. 
We cannot hope for more than such class-similarity in 
re-coding. If we define the task more strictly by 
requesting that one of the re-coded images be equal 
in all its detail to the given one, we could always 
provide a trivial re-coding: scan the given image, 
store it, and output it upon request. If not only one, 
but several images were given at the start, the trivial 
code would have to be slightly more complex. We 
would scan all the given ones, store them, and 
prepare code containing a switch that randomly 
selects and outputs one of the stored cases.  
We conclude that the task of re-coding always allows 
for a super-trivial solution that is not based on 
constructive code. The trivial new coding, in fact, 
evades the problem of coding altogether. An 
acceptable solution of the re-coding problem requires 
that the new image be constructed in such a way that 
the new encoding requires a good measure of 
similarity between the given sample of results from 
the unknown program and the output of the new code. 
To solve this task, we must carry out an analysis of 
basic elements, structures and superstructures, 
measurements, and other analytic investigation of the 
given sample. The job of re-tracing an unknown 
algorithm of generative art surprisingly puts us into 
the situation of an extremely accurate analysis of 
works of art. 
In tasks of re-coding, we see a good chance for 
introducing generative art into art education. We see 
chances for school kids, students, and adults to 
engage in both, artistic and algorithmic, activities 
offering new and rewarding experiences. Such 
activities may have the potential of helping us to 
remain true human beings whilst the environment 
around us is accelerating the digital race. We see 
chances for slow lingering against fast glimpsing. 
In the fall of 2012, the US-American "creative 
technologist" (as he called himself), Matthew Epler, 
came up with the idea of re-coding works of early 
algorithmic art. Epler considers himself a person 
"specializing in creating one of-a-kind interactive 
projects" (Epler, w.d.). On the website of his ReCode 
Project (meanwhile largely abandoned) he wrote: 
"The ReCode Project is a community-driven 
effort to preserve computer art by translating 
it into a modern programming language 
(Processing). … The focus of the ReCode 
Project is three-fold: 
1. Bring historic works of computer art back 
into the public eye. 
2. Make it accessible and useable. 





Not much later, British artist Mark Webster suggested 
to Epler to organize a series of events, including the 
idea of cities declaring themselves to become 
ProcessingCities [4]. Whereas Epler concentrated on 
his website inviting people to re-code early computer 
art, Webster wanted people to connect in actual 
spaces experiencing aspects of art history in a new 
way by learning from pioneers. It seems that besides 
a challenging but quite limited re-coding workshop 
and lecture in 2013 in Bordeaux, France, not much 
has actually happened. As far as we know, there are 
hardly any publications about the approach, and after 
a series of rather trivial re-codings of computer-
generated images taken from Grace Hertlein's short-
lived magazine Computer Graphics and Art (Hertlein, 
1976-1978) nothing tangible seems to have come 
from the idea. 
The very idea of re-coding, however, caught on in our 
research group at the University of Bremen in 
Germany. Perhaps different from the original 
intentions, and not without critical analysis of the 
potentials of the approach, we have over a number of 
years gathered a fair amount of hands-on experience 
in study projects of re-coding. As part of our long-term 
project on algorithmic art [5], we have offered several 
seminars and workshops for individual re-coding 
efforts of various kinds. So even if Matthew Epler's 
first impulse was met by only little resonance, via 
Mark Webster's French connection the idea of re-
coding fell on fertile ground in the North of Germany. 
4 | TWO MORE EXAMPLES 
The idea of re-coding has strong limitations. The two 
examples we have used for the purpose of 
demonstration are extremely simple. Even though the 
drawings contain areas of densely packed 
intersections of lines, where it is almost impossible to 
successfully discern the exact paths of criss-crossing 
lines, we were able to come up with highly probable 
correct hypotheses.  
Such a situation is, however, exceptional and very 
soon the complexity of a set of images gets so high 
that only by accident or by great expert experience in 
a certain field of scientific and artistic decision-making 
is there any chance to re-code the original algorithm. 
Based on Figures 3 and 4, we will indicate cases of 
almost impossible tasks of re-coding.  
Saying something is impossible, is dangerous. Why 
should not someone of advanced background in 
algorithmic art appear who, given enough time, would 
eventually find the level of analysis where our claim 
of unbreakability breaks down? We want to indicate 
this level in the case of Figure 3.  
Let us make explicit a few characteristics of the image 
of Figure 3, and also pose questions that must be 
answered if we want to stand a realistic chance of re-
coding the drawing. We easily discover horizontal 
and vertical bars of black, blue, and yellow color. 
They are of varying line-width and length. We see 
empty spaces between the bars, irregularly 
distributed, as it seems. An enlarged version of the 
image would help to measure the lengths and widths 
and, thereby, come up with a description of the set of 
elementary signs used for the image. Some initial 
insight is possible. 
But what about the areas where the black color 
almost disappears to make room for the blue and 
yellow strokes? What are shape characteristics of 
that area? Assuming from earlier experience that this 
kind of algorithmic art is likely to be based on some 
kind of randomness, and knowing that randomness 
comes in many varieties according to probability 
distributions of many kinds and parameter settings, 
we may generate conjectures. But how to test them 
in an attempt to get closer to a convincing re-coding? 
Is there a definite borderline to the somehow 
curvingly-shaped inner area of blue and yellow? 
Once in a while, we still see a bit of black but the two 
 
Figure 3. Frieder Nake: Abteiberg Walk through Raster, 2005. 
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black and not-black areas  are hard to delineate. If 
geometry doesn't help the analysis, what else can we 
try? 
We have reason to assume that without help from 
outside, perhaps from the artist himself who – thinking 
the image and not making it – made use of something 
that defies re-discovery unless an accidental flash of 
thought comes to rescue. In order to offer such a 
flash, who of our readers would have assumed that 
the image was first generated as a Markov chain with 
non-stationary transition probabilities? It was then 
mapped from the linear chain onto the planar area by 
a space-filling method. Did your thinking go in this 
direction? 
Our claim is that it is extremely unlikely that this kind 
of conjecture emerges in one of the observers. The 
hint of "Markov chain" will, in the mathematically 
educated generate some inkling of "Aha!". But such a 
mind would still need to do a lot of analysis to solve 
the riddle in a way that would allow us to accept the 
new code as a re-coding. We may be inclined to 
conclude, that the task is, under most circumstances, 
too complex to solve. 
It is definitely too complex to solve if we are given only 
one image to start with. The situation may change 
mildly if we start from ten or twenty images that the 
original program has generated. The larger the 
sample is, and the more advanced our analytical tools 
are – themselves given as software –, the higher our 
chances for a decent re-coding. This would tend to 
become a case of big data! 
The program behind Figure 3 was called Walk-
through-raster. According to the non-stationary 
transition probabilities and one of several modes of 
mapping a chain onto the plane, an arbitrarily given 
repertoire of signs is distributed into the cells of a grid. 
The algorithm, by its rather strong local control is 
capable of letting emerge global structural or 
compositional features. We believe, this was, fifty 
years ago, a remarkable discovery. 
Casey Reas' image of Figure 4  is another example 
beyond the simplistic assumptions of naive re-coding. 
Without clues from the artist, no analyst has a chance 
to re-code it. We do know that there is an algorithm 
behind the visual appearance. But, in this case, to 
come up with at least a description of events that may 
happen (the image is taken from a dynamic 
installation) appears much too complex. We may 
admire what we see but to say precisely why we 
admire it, seems beyond our imagination. 
Remember: If our descriptions are to be turned into 
algorithmic form, they must satisfy hard 
requirements.  
We hope to have now indicated the extremes (of 
trivial and impossible), between which a kind of new 
approach to art education may be tried. Neither the 
trivial nor the (almost) unattainable are interesting for 
educational purposes. Interesting is the possible, the 
challenging but realistic. That's the middle ground 
between the extremes. 
5 | ALGORITHMIC THINKING 
Like all other animals, humans engage in purposeful 
activities most of their lives. A very special of our 
activities is happening without much of other 
movement: Thinking, reflecting. We can see a person 
sitting somewhere without speaking, not moving arms 
nor legs, silently looking in one direction without 
showing signs of bodily engagement, perhaps even 
with eyes closed – in short, a symbol of high 
concentration. He or she, we may conclude, is 
thinking. If our ordinary activities are oriented towards 
changing something in the outside environment 
around us and if we call these external activities, our 
internal activities are oriented towards changing 
something inside. We may say, they change our inner 
state. 
Of course, those two modes of activity cannot be 
strictly separated. In reality, they are interlinked and 
interwoven. For analytical purposes, however, 
separating is justified. Separation permits us to say 
that internal thinking takes as its subject matter an 
external operation. An individual's thinking is 
reflecting an other. The other may be the thinker, or 
an operation by the thinker. 
 





For practical reasons, we distinguish various kinds of 
thinking: Speculative thinking, logical thinking, 
associative thinking, and more. Each one of those is 
a reduction of thinking to a special subject matter or 
a special manner of thinking. When we speculate, we 
allow ourselves to think of everything only loosely 
connected to the current subject matter, or not 
connected to it at all. In speculating, we allow 
ourselves to leave behind what we wanted to 
concentrate on, often together with others.  
In logical thinking we allow for progression from one 
statement to the next only by obeying a set of rather 
strict rules that control sequences of interconnected 
statements to be made in such a manner that all 
those participating in the activity agree on the 
conclusion derived from one or several of the already 
established propositions. To say that a conclusion 
was erroneous, in the case of logical progression, 
amounts to the proof that a derivation did not obey 
the agreed-upon rules. In logical thinking, a maximum 
of non-subjectivity is achieved. 
In associative thinking, the connection between one 
or several already established statements and a next 
statement is much looser. Statements in a sequence 
of statements are connected (and, thus, build a 
derivation or progression of thought) by some 
common words or feelings or subjective experience, 
often quite close to speculation. Whereas in 
speculation each and every neighborhood is 
permitted in a chain of thought, in association a vague 
kind of aesthetics is allowed. 
Here, our interest is algorithmic thinking. It is a way of 
thinking towards algorithms and in algorithms, or in 
statements and formulations that satisfy the rigor of 
precision, clarity, operability, and unambiguity. 
Algorithmic and logical thinking are close relatives of 
each other. Algorithmic thinking is even stricter than 
logical thinking insofar as all final consequences in 
algorithmic thinking must be operational. That is, it 
must be possible to carry out by machine the final 
operations. 
The particular kind of machine, its details of operation 
(the operating system's and programming languages' 
intricacies) are of no avail. In algorithmic thinking, we 
are not thinking of programs, but of algorithms. 
Algorithms are the abstract forms of programs. But 
the two are, of course, very close to each other. 
Somebody may be a good algorithmic thinker without 
being a good programmer. But it is unlikely that he or 
she would not digress into a bit of programming just 
to see whether an algorithmic formulation would 
survive the purgatory of a concrete computer. 
The result of an effort in algorithmic thinking is an 
algorithmic system. As such, it is in all its aspects 
unambiguous. This amounts to saying, there is one 
and only one interpretation of each execution of the 
algorithmic system. The result of such an execution 
may be interpreted differently by the human 
witnesses, of course. But those humans embed the 
algorithm's result into their contexts, immediately and 
by necessity. By doing so, the humans interpret in 
their ways, namely according to their interests, 
intentions, etc. The machine, when executing the 
algorithmic operation, has only one context: the 
context of computability. Between two interventions 
by the human ("interactive acts") everything is 
computable and, thus, does not allow for different 
interpretations. 
So algorithmic thinking is a way of thinking by humans 
who are in full command of all their incredibly rich 
powers of interpretation. However, in the course of its 
happening, such a thinking must narrow down 
everything to uniquely and precisely interpretable 
actions. Algorithmic thinking is thus a kind of thinking 
that requires of the human an approach and attitude 
that is non-human. Algorithmic thinking is deeply 
heroic because it demands of the semiotic animal (the 
human) to prepare for the semiotic machine (the 
computer) to take over, and this taking-over can 
successfully be prepared only if the human reduces 
all his or her capabilities to the trivial. 
We may describe the human's task in thinking 
algorithmically by a sequence of three reductions. 
Whatever the process and phenomenon may be that 
a group of humans are considering worthwhile to be 
redone in an algorithmic way, they must do this:  
1. reduce the worldly process to semiotic 
aspects, 
2. reduce the semiotics to syntactics only, 
3. reduce the syntactics to computability only. 
6 | ART EDUCATION AND THE ALGORITHMIC 
DIMENSION 
The algorithmic dimension of a phenomenon is all 
that pertains to the phenomenon under consideration 
when we reduce events, things, and processes to 
their algorithmic components, aspects, features, 
characteristics, etc. We enter the algorithmic 
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dimension when we strictly reduce thinking to its 
algorithmic forms. In a strict sense, none of us can do 
this. But we are pragmatic enough to know that, in 
any real-world activity and contemplation, we can 
easily jump back- and forward between certain sets 
of restrictions that we impose on our activity. We may 
say that, when thinking algorithmically, we inhabit the 
algorithmic dimension of the world. We have 
described how this is a domain in the world of 
unambiguity, of one and only one interpretation, of the 
reduction of rich human capacities to poor machinic 
capacities [6].  
How different from art that is! Can we imagine a 
greater difference than that – between the infinitely 
open space of interpreting and doing anything in the 
artistic domain, and the poor one-and-only-one 
interpretation that the machine requires, by the very 
fact of being a machine, if we want to use it in an 
interesting, new, exciting, extravagant, arousing, 
beautiful, surprising, heavenly or devilish manner! 
There is, we claim, no greater difference. And yet, we 
know, that exactly this is happening: the impossible 
meeting of always only one interpretation on one side, 
and infinitely many interpretations on the other. 
People now usually call this enormous revolution the 
Digital Revolution, and they speak of what is 
happening as the process of digitization. We prefer 
the term Algorithmic Revolution. For, what is 
happening is characterized much better by processes 
of reducing anything in society to computable, i.e. 
algorithmic, form. The fact that this takes place by all 
objects being coded in digital ways, is only accidental 
and not really worth mentioning. The belittling of the 
computability reduction as a digital encoding thus 
appears as an ideological attack against an 
enlightening critique. 
Art is enlightening, often in the most literal sense. Art 
education – as a stream of educational efforts 
towards free and open judgement beyond immediate 
interest – requires awareness and practice of 
enlightened critique. 
Art education in postmodern times, in times of the 
algorithmic revolution, in times of permanent 
accessibility and ubiquitous surveillance, in times 
when the individual disappears behind a permanent 
flow of data from all of his or her innocent and 
everyday activities, the transformation of the human 
being into a source of data – art education in such 
times should and can be taken up as interruption and 
intervention. Art always disrupts and disturbs, at least 
this was the case during the twentieth century. That 
century ended in a close connection between human 
and machine by the machine's transformations into 
automaton, tool, and medium. The three capacities of 
computability, interactivity, and connectivity stand for 
these three ontological modes of the semiotic 
machine.  
Works of art are complex signs, open for never 
ending chains of interpretation, open for the three 
ontological aspects of the machine. Outside of the 
realms of affirmative action, there is only the realm of 
art where the human can still unfold his or her 
genuinely human capacities freely and critically. We 
are all responsible to contribute to this. 
 
Figure 5. Manfred Mohr: A formal language (P-49), 1970. Credit: 
V&A Museum London. 
 
Figure 6. Students analyzing Mohr's "A formal language". 




7 | CONCLUDING REMARK 
We have come to regard all entities that algorithmic 
processes get hold of as algorithmic signs. (Nake, 
2004) Following Charles Sanders Peirce, the sign is 
a first (the representamen) standing for a second (the 
object) by virtue of, or creating, a third (the 
interpretant). (Peirce, 1992) The interpretant is the 
result of an act of interpretation; that is interpreting 
("making sense of") an encounter of a perceivable 
occurrence of a something (representing) and some 
other (represented). The interpretant is itself a sign so 
that Peirce's concept of sign and semiotic processes 
is in itself recursive. This makes it the most prominent 
concept of our times. 
We have extended the Peircean concept of sign a bit 
by considering sign processes between computers 
and humans, between semiotic machines and 
semiotic animals. The first, the machine, is an 
interpreter that cannot really interpret, since its 
interpretation is not characterized as open according 
to contexts, but rather restricted to the only context of 
computability. Thus, the machine's interpretant is 
really a determinant: the result of the computable kind 
of interpretation that must determine the one and only 
one meaning that a piece of code can have if it is 
correct code. 
The algorithmic sign thus, additionally to Peirce's 
sign, contains another component, the determined 
interpretant. It makes sense to call the old interpre-
tant, generated or given by a human, the intuitive or 
intentional interpretant. 
Instead of "algorithmic sign", we also use the 
metaphor of an inseparable union of surface and 
subface. (Nake, 2008) According to it, anything on a 
computer must be characterized as a pair of surface 
and subface. The surface is for the human to perceive 
by one or several of the senses; the subface is for the 
computer to manipulate by one or several algorithms. 
What is happening on a computer is a permanent 
switching between those two. But the human is 
usually aware of only the surface processes, the 
computer is only aware (if it could be "aware" of 
anything) of the subface processes. 
A programmer, and any other person doing some-
thing involving periods of computation, engages in 
such complex processes. The programmer is 
preparing subfaces for other persons later perceiving 
surfaces. In contemporary processes of art 
education, teachers and students have a chance to 
better become aware of what is happening in the 
algorithmic dimension by preparing subfaces that will 
later generate surfaces of aesthetic qualities. This is 
new. It is essential. It can be done, and is a bridge 
between science and art. 
ENDNOTES 
[1] This paper is a completely new version of our 
earlier paper Grabowski & Nake (2017). 
[2] Georg Nees was the first to exhibit computer-
generated and automatically drawn graphic works. 
This show was put up in rooms of the Studien-Galerie 
of the Stuttgart Institute of Technology (today: 
University of Stuttgart) from 5 to 19 February, 1965. 
For the occasion, Max Bense wrote his paper, 
"Projekte generativer Ästhetik" (Bense & Nees, 
1965). Nees later became the first to do a doctoral 
thesis on computer art (Nees, 1969). 
[3] The second exhibition of so-called computer art 
took place at the then famous avantgarde Howard 
Wise Gallery in New York City. It was dedicated to 
works by A. Michael Noll and Bela Julesz, both from 
Bell Laboratories in Murray Hill, NJ. It was on display 
from 6 to 24 April, 1965. 
[4] The term "Processing" here refers to the 
programming system of Processing (Reas & Fry, 
2014) 
[5] The roots of a series of projects under the title of 
"compArt" reach back to the earliest experiments of 
algorithmic art in the mid-1960s. 
[6] Figure 5 shows an early computer-generated 
picture by Manfred Mohr, and Figure 6 is taken from 
students engaged in analyses of Moohr's piece. 
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